Buffalo Law Review
Volume 7

Number 1

Article 41

10-1-1957

Creditor's Rights—Unavailability of New York Lien Law to out of
State Realty
Richard Vogt

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview
Part of the Commercial Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Richard Vogt, Creditor's Rights—Unavailability of New York Lien Law to out of State Realty, 7 Buff. L. Rev.
104 (1957).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol7/iss1/41

This The Court of Appeals Term is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact
lawscholar@buffalo.edu.

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
in this context was not dependent on notions "of intrinsic fairness of price," and
that to render an option invalid it was necessary to show more than a mere
disparity between the current value and the option price.
Plaintiff also contended that the requirements of section 176 of the Personal
Property Law22 had not been complied with in that the restriction had not been
printed on the stock certificate. Here the Court held that a notation on the stock
certificate that it was held subject to restrictions contained in certain enumerated
by-laws satisfied the statutory requirement.
The decision in this case indicates that the Court is unwilling to make a
careful study of the ultimate fairness of a price arrived at by the use of a formula
specified in this type of option. Rather, the scope of inquiry will be limited to
testing the reasonableness of the formula itself, and weighing heavily in favor of
an ultimate determination of validity is the fact that the parties involved, in a
sense, voluntarily agreed to its use.
CREDITOR'S

RIGHTS

Unavailability Of New York Lien Law To Out Of State Realty
Section 36-b of the New York Lien Law provides that funds received from
an owner by a subcontractor for the improvement of real property are to be held
in trust, to be applied first to the payment of materialmen and laborers who
contributed to the improvement. In Allied Thermal Corporationv. James Talcolt
Inc., I materialmen attempted to use the trust provision of 36-b to compel factor
to subcontractor to account for funds allegedly diverted by the subcontractor. The
only issue before the Court was whether plaintiff-materialmen could use section
36-b, when the situs of the improved realty was out of state.
The Court held (5-2), without citing authority, that plaintiffs could not avail
themselves of the protective trust provisions of the statute. The majority
determined that section 36-b must not be construed independently, but as an
integral part of the whole statutory scheme of the Lien Law, which by its very
nature is circumscribed by the state's boundaries. The majority regarded the
absence of any expressed reference to "New York" anywhere in the Lien Law as
22.

1.

N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §176 provides:
There shall be no lien in favor of a corporation upon the
shares represented by a certificate issued by such corporation
and there shall be no restriction by virtue of- any by-law of
such corporation, or otherwise, unless the right of the corporation to such lien or the restriction is stated on the
certificate.
3 N.Y.2d 302, 165 N.Y.S.2d 91 (1957).
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an obvious indication that section 36-b should not receive any special jurisdictional
distinction from the rest of the Lien Law.
The dissent argued that section 36-b did not confer any lien rights whatsoever; that the gravamen of plaintiffs action is the funds diverted, not the real
property; that this was a right in personam to impress a trust upon the funds
diverted, and thus should not be restricted by the in rem lien concept adhering
to real property.
To the assumption of the majority that "real property" in the Lien Law must
be restricted to New York because of no contrary expressed intention of the
Legislature, the dissent pointed out that a similar argument had been rejected in
Mallory Associates v. Barving Realty Co.2 In that case the Court determined that
section 233 of the Real Property Law (providing that moneys, deposited as
security for performance of realty contracts, are to constitute trust funds in the
hands .of depositee) was applicable to a deposit made in New York, even though
the lease affected real property located in Virginia. "The Legislature did not
expressly limit the statute to deposits made under a contract for the use or rental
of real property situated in New York, and we do not think it should be thus
limited by judicial construction."
The dissent further pointed out that now New York materialmen and
laborers could be defrauded with impunity, whenever the realty to be improved
was outside the state, since the foreign state would also lack jurisdiction to
impress a trust upon the funds diverted in New York. In Ridgefield Supply Co. v.
Rosen,4 a similar situation to the instant case, the Court was of the same
opinion.
The reasoning of the majority appears unduly mechanical. It is difficult
to conceive that the Legislature intended to protect and benefit only those
materialmen and laborers who contribute to the improvement of domestic realty.5
Since the Mallory case and the instant case have come to different results, there
exists minimal stability in this area. An official word from the Legislature
indicating the jurisdictional limits of statutes in this field, would go far in
obviating confusion and probable future litigation.
Priorify Of Liens
As between a judgment credtor's lien and the equitable lien of an assignee
of property subsequently to be a.quired, the latter, while his rights will be
2.
3.
4.

300 N.Y. 297, 90 N.E.2d 468 (1949).
Id. at 302, 90 N.E.2d at 471.
1 Misc.2d 675, 679, 147 N.Y.S.2d 337, 340 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
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